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Abstract
This paper defines an argumentation seman-
tics for extended logic programming and
shows its equivalence to the well-founded se-
mantics with explicit negation. We set up
a general framework in which we extensively
compare this semantics to other argumenta-
tion semantics, including those of Dung, and
Prakken and Sartor. We present a general
dialectical proof theory for these argumenta-
tion semantics.
1 Introduction
Argumentation has attracted much interest in the area
of AI. On the one hand, argumentation is an impor-
tant way of human interaction and reasoning, and is
therefore of interest for research into intelligent sys-
tems. Application areas include automated negoti-
ation via argumentation [15, 14, 18] and legal rea-
soning [17]. On the other hand, argumentation pro-
vides a formal model for various assumption based (or
non-monotonic, or default) reasoning formalisms [4, 5].
In particular, various argumentation based semantics
have been proposed for logic programming with de-
fault negation [4, 7].
Argumentation semantics are elegant since they can
be captured in an abstract framework [7, 4, 20, 12],
for which an elegant theory of attack, defence, ac-
ceptability, and other notions can be developed, with-
out recourse to the concrete instance of the reasoning
formalism at hand. This framework can then be in-
stantiated to various assumption based reasoning for-
malisms. Similarly, a dialectical proof theory, based on
dialogue trees, can be defined for an abstract argumen-
tation framework, and then applied to any instance of
such a framework [7, 11].
In general, an argument A is a proof which may use
a set of defeasible assumptions. Another argument B
may have a conclusion which contradicts the assump-
tions or the conclusions of A, and thereby B attacks
A. There are two fundamental notions of such attacks:
undercut and rebut [17] or equivalently ground-attack
and reductio-ad-absurdum attack [6]. We will use the
terminology of undercuts and rebuts. Both attacks
differ in that an undercut attacks a premise of an ar-
gument, while a rebut attacks a conclusion.
Given a logic program we can define an argumen-
tation semantics by iteratively collecting those argu-
ments which are acceptable to a proponent, i.e. they
can be defended against all opponent attacks. In fact,
such a notion of acceptability can be defined in a num-
ber of ways depending on which attacks we allow the
proponent and opponent to use.
Normal logic programs do not have negative con-
clusions, which means that we cannot use rebuts.
Thus both opponents can only launch undercuts on
each other’s assumptions. Various argumentation se-
mantics have been defined for normal logic programs
[4, 7, 13], some of which are equivalent to existing se-
mantics such as the stable model semantics [9] or the
well-founded semantics [8].
Extended logic programs [10, 2, 21], on the other hand,
introduce explicit negation, which states that a literal
is explicitly false. As a result, both undercuts and
rebuts are possible forms of attack; there are further
variations depending on whether any kind of counter-
attack is admitted. A variety of argumentation seman-
tics arise if one allows one notion of attack as defence
for the proponent, and another as attack for the op-
ponent. Various argumentation semantics have been
proposed for extended logic programs [6, 17]. Dung
has shown that a certain argumentation semantics is
equivalent to the answer set semantics [10], a generali-
sation of the stable model semantics [9]. To our knowl-
edge, no argumentation semantics has yet been found
equivalent to the well-founded semantics for extended
logic programs, WFSX [16, 2].
This paper makes the following contributions: we
define a least fixpoint argumentation semantics for
extended logic programs, and show its equivalence
to the well-founded semantics with explicit nega-
tion [16, 2, 1]. In order to relate this semantics to
other argumentation semantics, we set up a general
framework to classify notions of justified arguments,
and use it to compare our argumentation semantics to
those of Dung [6] and Prakken and Sartor [17] among
others. We develop a general dialectical proof theory
for the notions of justified arguments we introduce.
The paper is organised as follows: First we define argu-
ments and notions of attack and acceptability. Then
we set up a framework for classifying different least
fixpoint argumentation semantics, based on different
notions of attack. In Section 4, we recall the defini-
tion of WFSX, and in Section 5, we prove the equiv-
alence of an argumentation semantics and WFSX. A
general dialectical proof theory for arguments is pre-
sented in Section 6, and its soundness and complete-
ness is proven.
2 Extended Logic Programming and
Argumentation
We summarise the definitions of arguments for ex-
tended logic programs, and define various notions of
attack between arguments.
2.1 Arguments
Definition 1 An objective literal is an atom A or its
explicit negation ¬A. We define ¬¬L = L. A default
literal is of the form not L where L is an objective lit-
eral. A literal is either an objective or a default literal.
An extended logic program is a (possibly infinite) set
of rules of the form
L0 ← L1, . . . , Lm, not Lm+1, . . . , not Lm+n
where m,n ≥ 0, and each Li is an objective literal
(0 ≤ i ≤ m+ n).
For such a rule r, we call L0 the head of the rule,
head(r), and L1, . . . , not Lm+n the body of the rule,
body(r).
Our definition of an argument for an extended logic
program is based on [17]. Essentially, an argument is
a partial proof, resting on a number of assumptions,
i.e. a set of default literals.1
1In [4, 6], an argument is a set of assumptions; the two
approaches are equivalent in that there is an argument with
Note that we do not consider priorities of arguments,
as used e.g. in [17, 20].
Definition 2 Let P be an extended logic program.
An argument for P is a finite sequence A = [r1, . . . rn]
of rules ri ∈ P such that for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, for every
objective literal Lj in the body of ri there is a k > i
such that head(rk) = Lj.
A subargument of A is a subsequence of A which is
an argument. The head of a rule in A is called a con-
clusion of A, and a default literal not L in the body of
a rule of A is called an assumption of A. We write
assm(A) for the set of assumptions and conc(A) for
the set of conclusions of an argument A.
An argument A with a conclusion L is a minimal ar-
gument for L if there is no subargument of A with
conclusion L. An argument is minimal if it minimal
for some literal L. Given an extended logic program
P , we denote the set of minimal arguments for P by
ArgsP .
The restriction to minimal arguments is not essen-
tial, but convenient, since it rules out arguments con-
structed from several unrelated arguments. Generally,
one is interested in the conclusions of an argument,
and wants to avoid having rules in an argument which
do not contribute to the desired conclusion.
2.2 Notions of Attack
There are two fundamental notions of attack: under-
cut, which invalidates an assumption of an argument,
and rebut, which contradicts a conclusion of an ar-
gument [6, 17]. From these, we may define further
notions of attack, by allowing either of the two funda-
mental kinds of attack, and considering whether any
kind of counter-attack is allowed or not. We will now
formally define these notions of attacks.
Definition 3 Let A1 and A2 be arguments.
1. A1 undercuts A2 if there is an objective literal L
such that L is a conclusion of A1 and not L is an
assumption of A2.
2. A1 rebuts A2 if there is an objective literal L such
that L is a conclusion of A1 and ¬L is a conclu-
sion of A2.
3. A1 attacks A2 if A1 undercuts or rebuts A2.
4. A1 defeats A2 if A1 undercuts A2, or (A1 rebuts
A2 and A2 does not undercut A1).
a conclusion L iff there is a set of assumptions from which
L can be inferred. See the discussion in [17].
5. A1 strongly attacks A2 if A1 attacks A2 and A2
does not undercut A1.
6. A1 strongly undercuts A2 if A1 undercuts A2 and
A2 does not undercut A1.
The notions of undercut and rebut, and hence attack
are fundamental for extended logic programs [6, 17].
The notion of defeat is used in [17], along with a no-
tion of strict defeat, i.e. a defeat that is not counter-
defeated. For arguments without priorities, rebuts are
symmetrical, and therefore strict defeat coincides with
strict undercut, i.e. an undercut that is not counter-
undercut. Similarly, strict attack coincides with strict
undercut. For this reason, we use the term strong un-
dercut instead of strict undercut, and similarly define
strong attack to be an attack which is not counter-
undercut. We will use the following abbreviations for
these notions of attack. r for rebuts, u for undercuts,
a for attacks, d for defeats, sa for strongly attacks,
and su for strongly undercuts.
These notions of attack define for any extended logic
program a binary relation on the set of arguments of
that program.
Definition 4 A notion of attack is a function x which
assigns to each extended logic program P a binary rela-
tion xP on the set of arguments of P , i.e. xP ⊆ Args
2
P .
Notions of attack can be partially ordered by defining
x ⊆ y iff ∀P : xP ⊆ yP
Definition 5 Let x be a notion of attack. Then the
inverse of x, denoted by x−1, is defined as x−1P =
{(B,A) | (A,B) ∈ xP }.
In this relational notation, Definition 3 can be rewrit-
ten as a = u∪ r, d = u∪ (r−u−1), sa = (u∪ r)−u−1,
and su = u − u−1. Using the set-theoretic laws
A−B ⊆ A ⊆ A∪C and (A∪B)−C = (A−C)∪(B−C)
(for all sets A, B, and C), it is easy to see that the
notions of attack of Definition 3 are partially ordered
according to the following Hasse diagram.
attacks = a = u ∪ r
defeats =
d = u ∪ (r − u−1)
kkk
kkk
kkk
k
QQQ
QQ
undercuts = u
TTT
TTT
TTT
TT
strongly attacks =
sa = (u ∪ r) − u−1
lll
lll
strongly undercuts = su = u− u−1
This diagram contains the notions of attack used
in [6, 17], plus strongly attacks which seemed a nat-
ural intermediate notion between strongly undercuts
and defeats. We have not included rebuts, because in
the absence of priorities, rebuts is somewhat weaker
than undercuts, because it is symmetric: a rebut is al-
ways counter-rebutted, while the same does not hold
for undercuts.
2.3 Acceptability and Justified Arguments
Given the above notions of attack, we define accept-
ability of an argument. Basically, an argument is ac-
ceptable if it can be defended against any attack. De-
pending on which particular notion of attack we use
as defence and which for the opponent’s attacks, we
obtain a host of acceptability notions.
Acceptability forms the basis for our argumentation
semantics, which is defined as the least fixpoint of a
function, which collects all acceptable arguments. The
least fixpoint is of particular interest [17, 6], because it
provides a canonical fixpoint semantics and it can be
constructed inductively.
Definition 6 Let x and y be notions of attack. Let A
be an argument, and S a set of arguments. Then A
is x/y-acceptable wrt. S if for every argument B such
that (B,A) ∈ x there exists an argument C ∈ S such
that (C,B) ∈ y.
Based on the notion of acceptability, we can then de-
fine a fixpoint semantics for arguments.
Definition 7 Let x and y be notions of attack, and
P an extended logic program. The operator FP,x/y :
P(ArgsP )→ P(ArgsP ) is defined as
FP,x/y(S) = {A | A is x/y-acceptable wrt. S}
We denote the least fixpoint of FP,x/y by JP,x/y. If
the program P is clear from the context, we omit the
subscript P . An argument A is called x/y-justified if
A ∈ Jx/y; an argument is called x/y-overruled if it
is attacked by an x/y-justified argument; and an ar-
gument is called x/y-defensible if it is neither x/y-
justified nor x/y-overruled.
For any program P , the least fixpoint exists by
the Knaster-Tarski fixpoint theorem [19, 3], because
FP,x/y is monotone. It can be constructed by transfi-
nite induction as follows:
J0x/y = ∅
Jα+1x/y = FP,x/y(J
α
x/y) for α+1 a successor ordinal
Jλx/y =
⋃
α<λ J
α
x/y for λ a limit ordinal
Then there exists a least ordinal λ0 such that
Fx/y(J
λ0
x/y) = J
λ0
x/y = Jx/y.
3 Relationships of Notions of
Justifiability
This section is devoted to an analysis of the relation-
ship between the different notions of justifiability, lead-
ing to a hierarchy of notions of justifiability illustrated
in Figure 2.
First of all, it is easy to see that the least fixpoint
increases if we weaken the attacks, or strengthen the
defence.
Proposition 1 Let x′ ⊆ x, y ⊆ y′ be notions of at-
tack, then Jx/y ⊆ Jx′/y′ .
Theorem 2 states that it does not make a difference if
we allow only the strong version of the defence. This
is because an argument need not defend itself on its
own, but it may rely on other arguments to defend it.
We only give a formal proof for the first theorem; the
proofs for the other theorems are similar, and we pro-
vide an intuitive informal explanation instead.
Theorem 2 Let x and y be notions of attack such that
x ⊇ undercuts, and let sy = y − undercuts−1. Then
Jx/y = Jx/sy.
Proof. Informally, every x-attack B to an x/y-
justified argument A is y-defended by some x/sy-
justified argument C (by induction). Now if C was
not a sy-attack, then it is undercut by B, and because
x ⊇ undercuts and C is justified, there exists a strong
defence for C against B, which is also a defence of the
original argument A against C.
The formal proof is by transfinite induction. By
Proposition 1, we have Jx/sy ⊆ Jx/y. We prove the
inverse inclusion by showing that for all ordinals α:
Jαx/y ⊆ J
α
x/sy, by transfinite induction on α.
Base case α = 0: Jx/y = ∅ = Jx/sy.
Successor ordinal α ❀ α + 1: Let A ∈ Jα+1x/y , and
(B,A) ∈ x. By definition, there exists C ∈ Jαx/y such
that (C,B) ∈ y. By induction hypothesis, C ∈ Jαx/sy.
If B does not undercut C, then we are done. If, how-
ever, B undercuts C, then because C ∈ Jαx/sy, and
undercuts ⊆ x, there exists D ∈ Jα0x/sy(∅)(α0 < α)
such that (D,B) ∈ sy. It follows that A ∈ Jα+1x/sy.
Limit ordinal λ: Assume Jαx/y ⊆ J
α
x/sy for all α < λ.
Then Jλx/y =
⋃
α<λ J
α
x/y ⊆
⋃
α<λ J
α
x/sy = J
λ
x/sy ✷
In particular, the previous Theorem states that under-
cut and strong undercut are equivalent as a defence, as
are attack and strong attack. This may be useful in an
implementation, where we may use the stronger notion
of defence without changing the semantics, thereby de-
creasing the number of arguments to be checked. The
following Corollary shows that because defeat lies be-
tween attack and strong attack, it is equivalent to both
as a defence.
Corollary 3 Let x be a notion of attack such that
x ⊇ undercuts. Then Jx/a = Jx/d = Jx/sa.
Proof. With Proposition 1 and Theorem 2, we have
Jx/a ⊆ Jx/d ⊆ Jx/sa = Jx/a. ✷
Theorem 4 Let x be a notion of attack such that
x ⊇ strongly attacks. Then Jx/u = Jx/d = Jx/a.
Proof. Every x-attack B to a x/a-justified argu-
ment a is attacked by some x/u-justified argument C
(by induction). If C is a rebut, but not an under-
cut, then because B strongly attacks C, and because
x ⊇ strongly attacks, there must have been an argu-
ment defending C by undercutting B, thereby also de-
fending A against B.
The statement for defeats follows in a similar way to
Corollary 3.
✷
Theorem 5 Jsa/su = Jsa/sa
The proof is similar to Theorem 4.
Theorem 6 Jsu/a = Jsu/d
Proof. Every strong undercut B to a su/a-justified
argument A is attacked by some su/d-justified argu-
ment C (by induction). If C does not defeat A, then
there is some argument D defending C by defeating
B, thereby also defending A against B. ✷
We will now present some example programs which
distinguish various notions of justifiability.
Example 1 Consider P1 in Figure 1. For any no-
tion of attack x, we have Jsu/x = Jsa/x = {[p ←
not q], [q ← not p]}, because there is no strong un-
dercut or strong attack to any of the arguments. How-
ever, Ja/x = Jd/x = Ju/x = ∅, because every argument
is undercut (and therefore defeated and attacked).
Example 2 Consider P2 in Figure 1. Let x be
a notion of attack. Then Jd/x = Ja/x = ∅, be-
cause every argument is defeated (hence attacked).
P1 =
p ← not q
q ← not p
P2 =
p ← not q
q ← not p
¬p
P3 =
p ← not q
q ← not r
r ← not s
s ← not p
¬p
P4 =
p ← not q
q ← not p
r ← not p
P5 =
p ← not ¬p
¬p
P6 =
¬p ← not q
¬q ← not p
p
q
Figure 1: Examples
Jsa/su = Jsa/sa = {[q ← not p]}, because [q ← not p]
is the only argument which is not strongly attacked,
but it does not strongly attack any other argument.
Ju/su = Ju/u = {[¬p]}, because there is no under-
cut to [¬p], but [¬p] does not undercut any other ar-
gument. Ju/a = {[¬p], [q ← not p]}, because there is
no undercut to [¬p], and the undercut [p ← not p]
to [q ← not p] is attacked by [¬p]. We also have
Jsa/u = {[¬p], [q ← not p]}, because [q ← not p] is not
strongly attacked, and the strong attack [p← not q] on
[¬p] is undercut by [q ← not p].
Example 3 Consider P3 in Figure 1. Let x be a
notion of attack. Then Jsa/x = ∅, because every argu-
ment is strongly attacked.
Jsu/u = Jsu/su = {[¬p]}, because all arguments except
[¬p] are strongly undercut, but [¬p] does not under-
cut any argument. And Ju/a = Jsu/sa = Jsu/a =
{[¬p], [q ← not r], [s← not p]}.
Example 4 Consider P4 in Figure 1. Let x be a
notion of attack. Then Ju/x = Jd/x = Ja/x = ∅, be-
cause every argument is undercut. Jsu/su = Jsu/sa =
Jsa/su = Jsa/sa = {[p ← not q], [q ← not p]} In
this case, the strong attacks are precisely the strong
undercuts; The argument [r ← not p] is not justi-
fied, because the strong undercut [p ← not q] is un-
dercut, but not strongly undercut, by [q ← not p].
Jsu/u = Jsu/a = Jsa/u = Jsa/a = {[p ← not q], [q ←
not p], [r← not p]} Again, undercuts and attacks, and
strong undercuts and strong attacks, coincide; but now
[r ← not p] is justified, because non-strong undercuts
are allowed as defence.
Example 5 Consider P5 in Figure 1. Then Ja/x =
∅, because both arguments attack each other, while
Jd/x = {[¬p]}, because [¬p] defeats [p ← not ¬p], but
not vice versa.
Example 6 Consider P6 in Figure 1. Let x be a
notion of attack. Then Jsa/x = Jd/x = Ja/x = ∅,
because every argument is strongly attacked (hence de-
feated and attacked), while Ju/x = Jsu/x = {[p], [q]}.
Theorem 7 The notions of justifiability are ordered
(by set inclusion) according to the Hasse diagram in
Figure 2.
su/a = su/d
su/u
oooooo
su/sa
NNNNN
sa/u = sa/d = sa/a
||||
su/su
OOOOOOO
ppppp
u/a = u/d = u/sa
777
sa/su = sa/sa
BBBB
oooooo
u/su = u/u
NNNNN

d/su = d/u = d/a = d/d = d/sa
OOOOOO
ppppp
a/su = a/u = a/a = a/d = a/sa
Figure 2: Hierarchy of Notions of Justifiability
By definition, Dung’s grounded argumentation se-
mantics [6] is exactly a/u-justifiability, while Prakken
and Sartor’s semantics [17], if we disregard priorities,
amounts to d/su-justifiability. As corollaries to The-
orem 7, we obtain relationships of these semantics to
the other notions of justifiability.
Corollary 8 Let JDung be the set of justified argu-
ments according to Dung’s grounded argumentation se-
mantics [6]. Then JDung = Ja/su = Ja/u = Ja/a =
Ja/d = Ja/sa and JDung ⊆ Jx/y for all notions of at-
tack x and y.
Corollary 9 Let JPS be the set of justified arguments
according to Prakken and Sartor’s argumentation se-
mantics [17], where all arguments have the same prior-
ity. Then JPS = Jd/su = Jd/u = Jd/a = Jd/d = Jd/sa,
JPS ⊆ Jx/y for all notions of attack x 6= a and y, and
JPS ⊇ Ja/y for all notions of attack y.
Remark 1 1. The notions of a/x-, d/x- and sa/x-
justifiability are very sceptical in that a fact p may not
be justified, if there is a rule ¬p ← B (where not p 6∈
B) that is not x-attacked. On the other hand this is
useful in terms of avoiding inconsistency.
2. sx/y-justifiability is very credulous, because it does
not take into account non-strong attacks, so e.g. the
program {p ← not q, q ← not p} has the justified ar-
guments [p← not q] and [q ← not p].
Remark 2 One might ask whether any of the seman-
tics in Figure 2 are equivalent for non-contradictory
programs, i.e. programs for which there is no literal
L such that there exist justified arguments for both L
and ¬L. The answer to this question is no: all the
examples above distinguishing different notions of jus-
tifiability involve only non-contradictory programs.
In particular, even for non-contradictory programs,
Dung’s and Prakken and Sartor’s semantics differ, and
both differ from u/a-justifiability, which will be shown
equivalent to the well-founded semantics WFSX [16, 2]
in the following section.
4 Well-founded semantics
We recollect the definition of the well-founded seman-
tics for extended logic programs, WFSX. We use the
definition of [1], because it is closer to our definition of
argumentation semantics than the original definition
of [16, 2].
Definition 8 The set of all objective literals of a pro-
gram P is called the Herbrand base of P and denoted
by H(P ). A pseudo-interpretation of a program P is
a set T ∪ not F where T and F are subsets of H(P ).
An interpretation is a pseudo-interpretation where the
sets T and F are disjoint. An interpretation is called
two-valued if T ∪ F = H(P ).
Definition 9 Let P be an extended logic program, I
an interpretation, and let P ′ (resp. I ′) be obtained
from P (resp. I) by replacing every literal ¬A by a
new atom, say ¬ A. The GL-transformation P
′
I′ is the
program obtained from P ′ by removing all rules con-
taining a default literal not A such that A ∈ I ′, and
then removing all remaining default literals from P ′,
obtaining a definite program P ′′. Let J be the least
model of P ′′. ΓP I is obtained from J by replacing the
introduced atoms ¬ A by ¬A.
Definition 10 The semi-normal version of a program
P is the program Ps obtained from P by replacing every
rule L← Body in P by the rule L← not ¬L,Body.
If the program P is clear from the context, we write
ΓI for ΓP I and ΓsI for ΓPsI.
Definition 11 Let P be a program whose least fix-
point of ΓΓs is T . Then the paraconsistent well-
founded model of P is the pseudo-interpretation
WFMp(P ) = T ∪not (H(P )−ΓsT ). If WFMp(P ) is
an interpretation, then P is called non-contradictory,
and WFMp(P ) is the well-founded model of P , de-
noted by WFM(P ).
The paraconsistent well-founded model can by defined
iteratively by the transfinite sequence {Iα}:
I0 = ∅
Iα+1 = ΓΓsIα for successor ordinal α+ 1
Iλ =
⋃
α<λ Iα for limit ordinal λ
There exists a smallest ordinal λ0 such that Iλ0 is
the least fixpoint of ΓΓs, and WFMp(P ) = Iλ0 ∪
not (H(P )− ΓsIλ0 ).
5 Equivalence of argumentation
semantics and WFSX
In this section, we will show that the argumentation
semantics Ju/a and the well-founded model coincide.
That is, the conclusions of justified arguments are ex-
actly the objective literals which are true in the well-
founded model; and those objective literals all of whose
arguments are overruled are exactly the literals which
are false in the well-founded model. The result holds
also for contradictory programs under the paraconsis-
tent well-founded semantics. This is important, be-
cause it shows that contradictions in the argumenta-
tion semantics are precisely the contradictions under
the well-founded semantics, and allows the applica-
tion of contradiction removal (or avoidance) methods
to the argumentation semantics. Because for non-
contradictory programs, the well-founded semantics
coincides with the paraconsistent well-founded seman-
tics [1], we obtain as a corollary that argumentation se-
mantics and well-founded semantics coincide for non-
contradictory programs.
In order to compare the argumentation semantics with
the well-founded semantics, we define the set of literals
which are a consequence of the argumentation seman-
tics.
Definition 12 A(P ) = T ∪ not F , where
T = {L | there is a justified argument for L} and
F = {L | all arguments for L are overruled }.
The following Proposition shows a precise connection
between arguments and consequences of a program PI .
Proposition 10 Let I be a two-valued interpretation.
1. L ∈ Γ(I) iff ∃ argument A with conclusion L such
that assm(A) ⊆ I.
2. L ∈ Γs(I) iff ∃ argument A with conclusion L
such that assm(A) ⊆ I and ¬conc(A) ∩ I = ∅.
3. L 6∈ Γ(I) iff ∀ arguments A with conclusion L,
assm(A) ∩ I 6= ∅.
4. L 6∈ Γs(I) iff ∀ arguments A with conclusion L,
assm(A) ∩ I 6= ∅ or ¬conc(A) ∩ I 6= ∅.
Proof. See Appendix. ✷
Theorem 11 Let P be an extended logic program.
Then WFMp(P ) = A(P ).
Proof. First, note that A undercuts B iff ∃ L s.t.
not L ∈ assm(A) and L ∈ conc(B); and A rebuts B
iff ∃ L ∈ conc(A) ∩ ¬conc(B).
We show that for all ordinals α, Iα = Aα, by
transfinite induction on α.
Base case α = 0: Iα = ∅ = Aα
Successor ordinal α❀ α+ 1:
L ∈ Iα+1
iff (Def. of Iα+1)
L ∈ ΓΓsIα
iff (Prop. 10(1))
∃ argument A for L such that assm(A) ⊆ ΓsIα
iff (Def. of ⊆, and ΓsIα is two-valued)
∃ argument A for L such that
∀ not L ∈ assm(A), L 6∈ ΓsIα
iff (Prop. 10(4))
∃ argument A for L such that ∀ not L ∈ assm(A), for
any argument B for L,
( ∃ not L′ ∈ assm(B) s.t. L′ ∈ Iα or
∃ L′′ ∈ conc(B) s.t. ¬L′′ ∈ Iα )
iff (Induction hypothesis)
∃ argument A for L such that ∀ not L ∈ assm(A), for
any argument B for L, ( ∃ not L′ ∈ assm(B) s.t. ∃
argument C ∈ Jα for L′, or
∃ L′′ ∈ conc(B) s.t. ∃ argument C ∈ Jα for ¬L′′)
iff (Def. of undercut and rebut)
∃ argument A for L such that for any undercut B to
A, ( ∃ argument C ∈ Jα s.t. C undercuts B, or
∃ argument C ∈ Jα s.t. C rebuts B)
iff
∃ argument A for L such that for any undercut B to
A, ∃ argument C ∈ Jα s.t. C attacks B
iff (Def. of Jα+1)
∃ argument A ∈ Jα+1 for L
iff (Def. of Aα+1)
L ∈ Aα+1
Limit ordinal λ:
Iλ =
⋃
α<λ Iα and Aλ =
⋃
α<λAα, so by induction
hypothesis (Iα = Aα for all α < λ), Iλ = Aλ.
Now, we show that a literal not L is in the
well-founded semantics iff every argument for L is
overruled.
not L ∈ WFMp(P )
iff (Def. of WFMp(P ))
L 6∈ ΓsI
iff (Prop. 10(4))
for all arguments A for L,
( ∃ not L′ ∈ assm(A) s.t. L′ ∈ I, or
∃ L′′ ∈ conc(A) s.t. ¬L′′ ∈ I )
iff (I=A)
for all arguments A for L,
( ∃ not L′ ∈ assm(A) s.t. ∃ argument B ∈ J for L′,
or ∃ L′′ ∈ conc(A) s.t. ∃ argument B ∈ J for ¬L′′ )
iff (Def. of undercut and rebut)
for all arguments A for L, ( ∃ argument B ∈ J s.t. B
undercuts A, or ∃ argument B ∈ J s.t. B rebuts A )
iff
every argument for L is attacked by a justified
argument in J
iff (Def. of overruled)
every argument for L is overruled
iff (Def. of A(P ))
not L ∈ A(P ) ✷
Corollary 12 Let P be a non-contradictory program.
Then WFM(P ) = A(P ).
Remark 3 In a similar way, one can show that the
Γ operator corresponds to undercuts, while the Γs op-
erator corresponds to attacks, and so the least fix-
points of ΓΓ, ΓsΓ, and ΓsΓs correspond to Ju/u, Ja/u,
and Ja/a, respectively. In [1], the least fixpoints of
these operators are shown to be ordered as lfp(ΓsΓ) ⊆
lfp(ΓsΓs) ⊆ lfp(ΓΓs), and lfp(ΓsΓ) ⊆ lfp(ΓΓ) ⊆
lfp(ΓΓs). Because Ja/u = Ja/a ⊆ Ju/u ⊆ Ju/a
by Theorem 7, we can strengthen this statement to
lfp(ΓsΓ) = lfp(ΓsΓs) ⊆ lfp(ΓΓ) ⊆ lfp(ΓΓs).
6 Proof theory
One of the benefits of relating the argumentation se-
mantics Ju/a to WFSX is the existence of an efficient
top-down proof procedure for WFSX [1], which we can
use to compute justified arguments in Ju/a. On the
other hand, dialectical proof theories, based on dia-
logue trees, have been defined for a variety of argu-
mentation semantics [17, 11, 13]. In this section, we
present a sound and complete dialectical proof theory
for the least fixpoint argumentation semantics Jx/y for
any notions of attack x and y. Our presentation closely
follows [17]. As a further consequence, we obtain an
equivalence of the proof theory for WFSX and the di-
alectical proof theory for arguments.
Definition 13 An x/y-dialogue is a finite nonempty
sequence of moves movei = (Player i, Argi)(i > 0),
such that
1. Player i = P iff i is odd; and Player i = O iff i is
even.
2. If Player i = Player j and i 6= j, then Argi 6=
Argj .
3. If Player i = P and i > 1, then Argi is a minimal
argument such that (Argi, Argi−1) ∈ y.
4. If Player i = O, then (Argi, Argi−1) ∈ x.
The first condition states that the players P (Propo-
nent) and O (Opponent) take turns, and P starts. The
second condition prevents the proponent from repeat-
ing a move. The third and fourth conditions state
that both players have to attack the other player’s last
move, where the opponent is allowed to use the notion
of attack x, while the proponent may use y to defend
its arguments.
Definition 14 An x/y-dialogue tree is a tree of
moves such that every branch is a dialogue, and for all
moves movei = (P,Argi), the children of movei are
all those moves (O,Argj) such that (Argj , Argi) ∈ x.
Definition 15 A player wins an x/y-dialogue iff the
other player cannot move. A player wins an x/y-
dialogue tree iff it wins all branches of the tree. An
x/y-dialogue tree which is won by the proponent is
called a winning x/y-dialogue tree. An argument A is
provably x/y-justified iff there exists a x/y-tree with
A as its root, and won by the proponent. A literal L
is a provably justified conclusion iff it is a conclusion
of a provably x/y-justified argument. The height of
a dialogue tree is 0 if it consists only of the root, and
otherwise height(t) =
⋃
height(ti)+1 where ti are the
trees rooted at the grandchildren of t.
We show that the proof theory of x/y-dialogue trees is
sound and complete for any notions of attack x and y.
Theorem 13 An argument is provably x/y-justified
iff it is x/y-justified.
Proof. “If”-direction. We show by transfinite induc-
tion: If A ∈ Jαx/y, then there exists a winning x/y-
dialogue tree of height < α for A.
Base case α = 0:
Then there exists no argumentB such that (B,A) ∈ x,
and so A is a winning x/y-dialogue tree for A of height
0.
Successor ordinal α+ 1:
If A ∈ Jα+1x/y , then for any Bi such that (Bi, A) ∈ x
there exists a Ci ∈ Jαx/y such that (Ci, Bi) ∈ y. By in-
duction hypothesis, there exist winning x/y-dialogue
trees for the Ci. Thus, we have a winning tree rooted
for A, with children Bi, whose children are the win-
ning trees for Ci.
Limit ordinal λ:
If A ∈ Jλx/y, then there exists an α < λ such that
A ∈ Jαx/y; by induction hypothesis, there exists a win-
ning x/y-dialogue tree of height α for A.
“Only-if”-direction. We prove by transfinite induc-
tion: If there exists a winning tree of height α for A,
then A ∈ Jαx/y.
Base case α = 0:
Then there are no arguments B such that (B,A) ∈ x,
and so A ∈ J0x/y.
Successor ordinal α+ 1:
Let T be a tree with root A, whose children are Bi,
and the children of Bi are winning trees rooted at Ci.
By induction hypothesis, Ci ∈ Jαx/y. Because the Bi
are all those arguments such that (Bi, A) ∈ x, then A
is defended against each Bi by Ci, and so A ∈ J
α+1
x/y .
✷
As a corollary, we can relate the proof theory of WFSX
and the u/a-proof theory.
Corollary 14 L is a provably u/a-justified conclusion
iff there exists a successful T-tree [2] for L.
Proof. Follows from the fact that u/a-dialogue trees
are sound and complete for u/a-justifiability (The-
orem 13), that T -trees are sound and complete for
WFSX [2], and that u/a-justifiability and WFSX are
equivalent (Theorem 11). ✷
7 Conclusion and Further Work
We have identified various notions of attack for ex-
tended logic programs. Based on these notions of at-
tack, we defined notions of acceptability and least fix-
point semantics. These fixpoint semantics were related
by establishing a lattice of justified arguments, based
on set inclusion. We identified an argumentation se-
mantics Ju/a equal to the well-founded semantics for
logic programs with explicit negation,WFSX [2], and
established that JDung ⊆ JPS ⊆ Ju/a = WFSX ,
where JDung and JPS are the least fixpoint argumen-
tation semantics of Dung [6] and Prakken and Sar-
tor [17]. We have defined a dialectical proof theory
for argumentation. For all notions of justified argu-
ments introduced, we prove that the proof theory is
sound and complete wrt. the corresponding fixpoint
argumentation semantics. In particular, we showthe
equivalence of successful T-trees [2] in WFSX to prov-
ably u/a justified arguments.
Finally, it remains to be seen whether a variation in
the notion of attack yields interesting variations of al-
ternative argumentation semantics for extended logic
programs such as preferred extensions or stable exten-
sions [6]. It is also an open question how the hierarchy
changes when priorities are added as defined in [17, 20].
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 10
1. “If”-direction: Induction on the length n of the
derivation of L ∈ Γ(I).
Base case: n = 1:
Then there exists a rule L← not L1, . . . , not Ln
in P s.t. L1, . . . , Ln 6∈ I, and
[L← not L1, . . . , not Ln] is an argument for L
whose assumptions are contained in I.
Induction step: n❀ n+ 1:
Let L ∈ Γn+1(I). Then there exists a rule
r = L← L1, . . . , Ln, not L′1, . . . , L
′
m in P s.t.
Li ∈ Γn(I), and L′i 6∈ I. By induction hypothesis,
there exists arguments A1, . . . , An for L1, . . . , Ln
with assm(Ai) ⊆ I. Then A = [r] ·A1 · · ·An is
an argument for L such that assm(A) ⊆ I.
“Only-if” direction: Induction on the length of
the argument.
Base case: n = 1:
Then A = [L← not L1, . . . , not Ln], and
L1, . . . , Ln 6∈ I. Then L←∈
P
I , and L ∈ Γ
1(I).
Induction step: n❀ n+ 1:
Let A = [L←
L1, . . . , Ln, not L
′
1, . . . , not L
′
m; r2, . . . , rn] be an
argument s.t. assm(A) ⊆ I. A contains
subarguments A1, . . . , An for L1, . . . , Ln, with
assm(Ai) ⊆ I. Because L′1, . . . , L
′
m 6∈ I, then
L← L1, . . . , Ln ∈
P
I . By induction hypothesis,
Li ∈ Γ(I). so also L ∈ Γ(I).
2. “If”-direction: Induction on the length n of the
derivation of L ∈ Γs(I).
Base case: n = 1:
Then there exists a rule L← not L1, . . . , not Ln
in P s.t. ¬L,L1, . . . , Ln 6∈ I, and
[L← not L1, . . . , not Ln] is an argument for L
whose assumptions are contained in I, and
¬L 6∈ I.
Induction step: n❀ n+ 1:
Let L ∈ Γn+1(I). Then there exists a rule
r = L← L1, . . . , Ln, not L′1, . . . , L
′m in P s.t.
Li ∈ Γn(I), L′i 6∈ I, and ¬L 6∈ I. By induction
hypothesis, there exists arguments A1, . . . , An
for L1, . . . , Ln with assm(Ai) ⊆ I and
¬conc(Ai) ∩ I = ∅. Then A = [r] ·A1 · · ·An is an
argument for L such that assm(A) ⊆ I, and
¬conc(A) ∩ I = ∅.
“Only-if” direction: Induction on the length of
the argument.
Base case: n = 1:
Then A = [L← not L1, . . . , not Ln], and
¬L,L1, . . . , Ln 6∈ I. Then L←∈
Ps
I , and
L ∈ Γ1(I).
Induction step: n❀ n+ 1:
Let A = [L← L1, . . . , Ln, not L′1, . . . , not L
′
m; . . .]
be an argument s.t. assm(A) ⊆ I, and
¬conc(A) ∩ I = ∅. A contains subarguments
A1, . . . , An for L1, . . . , Ln, with assm(Ai) ⊆ I,
and ¬conc(Ai) ∩ I = ∅. Because L′1, . . . , L
′
m 6∈ I,
and ¬L 6∈ I, then L← L1, . . . , Ln ∈
P
I . By
induction hypothesis, Li ∈ Γ(I). so also
L ∈ Γ(I).
3. and 4. follow immediately from 1. and 2.,
because I is two-valued.
✷
